This paper investigates the optimal (effort-maximizing) structure of multi-stage sequentialelimination contests with pooling competition in each stage. We allow the contest organizer to design the contest structure in two arms: contest sequence (the number of stages, and the number of remaining contestants in each stage), and prize allocation. First, we find that the optimality of "winner-take-all" (single final winner, single final prize, no intermediate prizes) is independent of the contest sequence. Second, we show that the more complete the contest sequence is, the more efforts can be induced from the contestants. Therefore, the optimal contest eliminates one contestant at each stage until the finale, while a single winner takes over the entire prize purse. Our results not only rationalize various forms of multi-stage contests conducted in reality, such as the well-known Fox TV show "American Idol", but also shed light on the design of internal organizational hierarchy.
Introduction
Situations in which economic agents expend costly and non-refundable resources in order to win a limited number of prizes are fairly ubiquitous. For instance, high school students engage in academic efforts to compete for college admissions. Firms participate in research research tournament, as well as political rent-seeking. Following this thread of thinking, our paper addresses the issue of optimal (effort-maximizing) contest design in a multi-phase sequential Tullock contest setting with pooling competition in each stage. We recognize that the structure of a multi-stage contest consists of two aspects: the sequence (the number of stages, and the number of remaining contestants in each stage), and the allocation of prizes. Specifically, we answer the following questions. First, given the sequence of a multi-stage contest, and a fixed total of prize purses, how does the contest organizer allocate the prize mass to the recipients in order to maximize the efforts? Does a "winnertake-all" (single-winner and single-prize) contest necessarily dominate a contest that awards intermediate prizes? Second, given the number of participants and the total value of prizes, does a multi-stage contest, which sequentially eliminates contestants, drive more efforts, as compared to a single-stage simultaneous contest? What is the optimal contest sequence?
Third, does the sequence of the contest intertwine with the prize allocation in influencing the efforts?
We investigate the optimal contest sequence and the optimal prize allocation in a unified framework. We consider a multi-stage contest, in which N identical contestants compete for a fixed prize mass, instead of a given single prize. Each stage-contest is a pooling contest, in which each remaining contestant competes against all other remaining contestants. In each preliminary stage, a contestant competes not only for the "tickets" to the next stage, but also for nonnegative intermediate prizes. In the final stage, the remaining contestants compete for nonnegative final prizes only. We allow the contest organizer to maximize the total efforts in two arms: choosing the optimal contest sequence and allocating optimally the prize mass. We first show that the optimal allocation of the prize mass is independent of the contest sequence structure, and a "winner-take-all" (single-prize) contest dominates all other prize allocations. We then show that the more "complete" the contest sequence is, the more efforts the contestants expend. 2 As a consequence, the optimal contest that maximizes the total efforts is a (N − 1)-stage "Pyramid" contest that eliminates one contestant at each stage, and a single final winner takes over the entire prize purse. To summarize, our study provides rationales for (i) the multi-stage contest widely observed in reality; and (ii) the winner-take-all principle commonly assumed in modeling rent-seeking competition in a more general setting.
The Relation to the Literature
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993) raise the question "why do politicians frequently 'announce' that they have narrowed down a set of potential recipients of a 'prize' to a slate of finalists?" They examine the scenario, in which the politician optimally shortlists a set of fi-
nalists from a pool of rent seekers (who differ in their valuations for the final prize) to induce more competition, while the process of shortlisting does not involve rent-seeking activities on the part of contestants. Amegashie (1999) , they study the optimal intertemporal effort allocation of the contestants faced with resource constraints. Gradstein (1998) also contributes to this research agenda by comparing a simultaneous contest with a contest that consists of a series of pairwise subcontests.
Rosen (1986) considers a 2 N −contestant N−stage sequential contest: in each stage, two of the remaining contestants are matched into head-to-head confrontation, and the winner survives for the next stage. Yet he does not justify the optimality of the contest structure. In the sense of endogenizing the contest structure, our paper is more closely related to Gradstein and Konrad (1999), as well as Moldovanu and Sela (2006) . Gradstein and Konrad (1999) consider multi-stage imperfectly discriminatory contests that group identical contestants in preliminary stages. In contrast to Rosen (1986) and Amegashie (1999) , they allow the contest organizer to flexibly design the contest structure as a matching scheme. They show that the multi-stage contest adopted by Rosen (1986) may emerge as the optimum if the contest success function is less discriminatory. In a perfectly discriminatory contest setting, Moldovanu and Sela (2006) study the optimal contest architecture that specifies whether and how the contestants should be split into subgroups in the first-stage competition. They find that the optimality of contest architecture depends upon the properties of contestants' cost function, as well as the objective of the contest organizer. A single grand static contest maximizes the expected total efforts for the case of linear cost of effort. If the effort cost function is convex, a designer can benefit from splitting the contestants into several subgroups in the preliminary stage of the contest.
Our paper differs from these papers in two regards. Firstly, we allow remaining contestants to compete against "all others" in each stage, instead of matching them into different groups. We consider each stage of competition in the sequential elimination process as a multiple-winner multiple-loser contest (as first suggested by the seminal paper of Clark and Riis (1996) ): the winners are first selected to proceed to the next stage, while the rest of contestants are eliminated. 3 Amegashie (2000) compares the two following ways of "short- sider the optimal prize allocation in a one-stage perfectly discriminatory contest (all-pay auction). Matros (2005) allows the contest organizer to flexibly allocate his/her budget between a single winner's prize and losers' rewards to maximize the total efforts in a two-stage contest, and shows that a winner-take-all contest dominates.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In Section 3, we first derive the general solution of equilibrium efforts in a multi-stage multi-prize contest. We then present our results on the optimal contest structure. In addition, we discuss the implications and applications of these results. Section 4 provides a concluding remark. 4 The sequence of a given contest is therefore represented by a L-term non-increasing sequence
At all stages l = 1, 2, ..., L, the remaining contestants simultaneously exert their nonnegative efforts e l . The conditional probability that a contestant i ∈ Ω m l is selected in the m−th draw is then given by
In the case that all contestants up for a draw make zero effort, we assume that the selected is randomly chosen from the pool. Moreover, we assume that if Ω m l reduces to a singleton, then the only contestant is automatically selected for sure regardless of his effort.
At stage l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, the contestant selected in the m−th draw is awarded the prize W 
where
l ) is the probability that contestant i is selected in the m−th draw. Note that 
Denote by e l the symmetric equilibrium effort. From (3), when The first order condition for the interior equilibrium effort e l is thus
(4) and (5) lead to
Proposition 1 In a symmetric interior equilibrium of the contest in stage l, each remaining contestant exerts an effort of
Proposition 1, which directly stems from the first order condition (6), gives the interior equilibrium individual effort of each remaining contestant in stage l. It strictly increases with the expected future payoff V l+1 as the coefficient of
strictly increases with m, the index for the order of the draw. Thus, the equilibrium effort e l also increases with the value of "earlier" prizes W m l (the prizes awarded with earlier draws), where m satisfies
However, e l decreases with the values of later prizes W m l , where m satisfies
The solution for the symmetric equilibrium effort is valid and satisfies (6) if and only if Φ l ≥ 0
. Otherwise a corner solution applies and the equilibrium effort would be zero. Φ l < 0 may happen when sufficiently large prizes are awarded for the latest draws. In this case, the contestants prefer not to make positive effort, but to wait for the latest prizes.
As a result, the first order condition for interior solution fails, and the corner solution of zero effort arises. Here and hereafter, we assume Φ l ≥ 0, and restrict our attention to the (unique) symmetric interior equilibrium. In Section 3.2, we will show in detail that there is no loss of generality to focus only on the prize allocations that lead to interior equilibrium.
Rearrange the terms in (6), we have
N l e l . In this context, we assume that the total efforts accrue to the benefit of the contest organizer. Thus, the contest organizer is to choose the optimal sequences {N l } L l=1 and prize allocation {W m l |m = 1, ..., N l ; l = 1, ..., L} to maximize the total efforts E, subject to the budget constraint
3 Results
Preliminary Results
For convenience, we define Γ L+1 = 0. In a stage l, ∀l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, every symmetric contestant has the same chance of winning each component of the total stage-award N l+1 V l+1 + Γ l (including N l stage prizes and N l+1 tickets to the next stage) in a symmetric equilibrium.
Therefore, the conditional equilibrium expected payoff of a representative contestant at stage
, where e l is his/her equilibrium effort at stage l. The total of the N l contestants' equilibrium expected payoffs can then be written as
which implies
Proof. Summing up (11) over the L stages gives
Note
Thus, 
), for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}.
Using Lemma 2, we are able to recursively solve for V 1 as in Lemma 3, which states that V 1 can be written as a function of the prizes in the current and all future stages.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 3, we have the following result. 
3.2 The Optimal Prize Allocation By Lemma 1, the optimal prize allocation that maximizes the total efforts must minimize the equilibrium surplus V 1 . Thus, we can focus on the minimization of V 1 to solve the original effort-maximization problem.
Before we proceed, we first clarify why there is no loss of generality if we focus on prize allocations that lead to symmetric interior equilibrium. Recall (6) . An interior equilibrium
Suppose that the prize allocation makes Φ l < 0, which leads to the corner solution, i.e. e l = 0. First, note that if we allocate the entire Γ l to the first draw prize, it must follow that Φ l ≥ 0.
. Thus, the contest organizer can always shift the prize mass Γ l from later prizes to earlier prizes within the stage, and reach an allocation that delivers exactly Φ l = 0. The first order condition (6) is then reinstated and it renders an interior equilibrium with e l = 0. Thus, by appropriately shifting the prize mass from later prizes to earlier prizes, we can always apply condition (6) and obtain an interior equilibrium, which generates the same outcome as the corner solution equilibrium. Note from (10) that this adjustment of prizes does not alter V l as well. As a result, it does not affect the total efforts in any other stage of the contest. This means that we can ignore the possibility of a corner solution, and assume Φ l to be nonnegative without loss of generality.
, the optimal contest prize allocation that maximizes the total efforts E requires the entire prize purse to be allocated to the first prize in the final stage, i.e. W Proof. The proof consists of three steps.
Define for brevity
). From Lemma 3, we can then write V 1 as the sum of the L separate terms D l , l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, i.e.,
Step One: W Step Two: W 1 l = 0, for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L − 1}, and W 1 L = Γ, given a fixed total prize purse Γ ≤ Γ 0 .
Step one implies that V 1 can be reduced to the following form for the optimal prize allocation
Next, we show that for l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L−1}, if we move the prize mass W 
. Ignoring the common elements, we only need to compare
It follows that the weight on W 1 l is strictly greater than that on W 1 l+1 , which implies that shifting the mass of W Thus, we show that a "winner-take-all" contest maximizes the total efforts for any given contest sequence.
Step Three: Γ = Γ 0 , i.e., the contest organizer uses up the entire budget on prizes.
Based on steps one and two, Proposition 2 leads to that E can be reduced to the following form for the optimal prize allocation
Thus E strictly increases with Γ. Therefore, the entire budget Γ 0 should be allocated
Theorem 1 establishes that if the contestant organizer has the flexibility to allocate a fixed prize mass, a multi-stage contest that maximizes the total efforts must combine all the resource into a single final prize and reward it to a single final winner, regardless of the sequence of the contest. Our results therefore provide a rationale for the commonly assumed "winner-take-all" principle in modeling rent-seeking competition. Clark and Riis (1996) show that contestants expend more efforts if the contest is governed by a "winner-take-all" rule than they do if the number of positive prizes exceeds one. Theorem 1 confirms this insight in the context of multi-stage elimination contests.
Lemma 3 shows that V 1 is a weighted sum of the prizes awarded in all stages. The weights on prizes exhibit two interesting features. On one hand, within a single stage, an earlier prize has a smaller weight. This is due to the fact that a higher probability of winning an earlier prize demands higher efforts from a contestant. As a result, within a stage l, the contest organizer can increase the efforts by allocating the entire stage purse Γ l to the firstdraw prize, i.e. W 1 l = Γ l . 5 Therefore, we can focus on the contest structure that allocates the prize purse only to the first-draw prize of each stage. On the other hand, between any two stages, a first-draw prize awarded in a later stage has a smaller weight. The intuition is that contestants have to (repeatedly) exert their further efforts to win a prize awarded in a later stage. In other words, a prize at a higher rank of the ladder demands more efforts from a contestant. To induce the highest subsequent efforts, all resources should then be allocated as one single prize at the last stage. Aggregating both the "within" and "between" effects leads to the optimality of "winner-take-all" in our multi-stage setting.
The Optimal Contest Sequence: Pyramid Contest
Having established the "winner-take-all" principle as the optimal prize allocation rule in any multi-stage contest, it remains to ask what is the optimal sequence of the contest (the number of stages and the number of remaining contestants in each stage). Next, we study how the contest organizer optimally chooses the sequence {N l } L l=1 to maximize the total efforts E. By Theorem 1, the allocation of prize mass is independent of the sequence of the contest, we therefore simply restrict our attention to the case with a single prize W 1 L = Γ 0 . Rewriting Lemma 3 by setting all prizes other than W 1 L to be zero leads to
First of all, for mathematical convenience, we consider only the contest sequences with The effect of this additional stage on the total efforts in the contest is not readily seen:
although the additional stage M creates a new source of efforts Me M , the impact of this additional stage on the contestants' effort entries in previous stages is ambiguous. First, from (8) , N J e J may either decrease or increase, although N J e J tends to be reduced as the value of the ticket to the next stage is lower (
). This is due to the fact that in (8) , N J e J is not a monotonic function of the number of survivors to the next stage. 6 For the same reason, the impact of the additional stage on the stage payoff V J is also indefinite. Second, the additional stage's impact on the efforts in stages prior to stage J, N j e j , j < J, is also ambiguous. From (8) , N j e j , j < J, would change in the same direction as V j+1 , which in turn changes in the same direction as V J .
Let E({N l }) denote the set composed of all the integers in the sequence {N l }.
We show in the following theorem that any additional stage always increases the total efforts, regardless of the existing contest structure.
Theorem 2
The more complete the contest sequence is, the higher the total efforts are induced.
Proof. Denote by E 0 the total efforts in the original contest {N l }, while by E M the total efforts in the new contest after one additional stage M is inserted. We only need to show
Denote by e V 1 the equilibrium expected payoff that the N contestants anticipate at the first stage of the contest after the additional stage is inserted. By Lemma 1, we simply need to show e V 1 < V 1 .
Under the optimal prize allocation characterized in Theorem 1, Lemma 2 leads to that
Similarly, 6 The following example shows that the component N l+1 −
To establish that e V 1 < V 1 , we need to show
is decreasing in g,
. Thus,
)(
The last step follows Chebyshev Sum Inequality.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 is important. It establishes that an additional stage of competition always reduces a representative contestant's expected payoff V 1 , so as to increase the total efforts.
A contest sequence is not optimal, as long as the difference between any two successive terms in the sequence {N l } L l=1 exceeds one. The total efforts of the contest can be increased if additional stages can be inserted, regardless of its existing structure. Thus, the optimal contest sequence is represented by a N−term strictly decreasing arithmetic sequence {N l |N l = N − l + 1, l = 1, 2, ..., N.}. The last term N N = 1 represents the unique final winner. In other words, the contest lasts for N − 1 stage, and one contestant is eliminated in each stage. 7 We name it as a complete-sequence "Pyramid" contest. Theorem 3 naturally stems from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Thus, we conclude that the optimal contest must be organized as a "winner-take-all" complete-sequence "Pyramid"
contest.
Theorem 4
The optimally designed N-person contest with the total prize purse of Γ 0 , i.e. 7 In stage N − 1, two remaining contestants compete for one final prize.
the "winner-take-all" "Pyramid" contest, induces a total equilibrium effort of
Theorem 4 explicitly shows the equilibrium total efforts in the optimally designed Nperson contest. The result directly arises from Lemma 1 and (18), and the fact that the sequence structure of the optimal contest is represented by a complete sequence of integers from N to 1.
Discussion
So far we have shown that a contest drives more efforts, provided that the contestants have to survive a longer line of shots before they win the final prize. Our results therefore provide a rationale for the widely observed multi-phase sequential competition in reality.
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) argue that the contest organizer (politicians) may strategically shortlist a subset of finalists, according to their valuations, to participate in rent-seeking competitions (for instance, IOC selects potential candidate cities up for the election of hosting cities of Olympic Games), in order to increase the rent-seeking revenue.
We suggest an alternative view to this thread of thinking: shortlisting benefits the contest organizer even if the contestants are identical.
Our paper provides useful insights to contests design. We show that the optimal contest that generates the most efforts is a "winner-take-all" complete-sequence "Pyramid" contest.
The famous Fox TV show "American Idol" echoes our results pretty well. The show is basically a singing contest. Twelve contestants are picked out from "thousands and thousands of hopeful superstars". These twelve "winners", however, are not met with immediate success. The remaining part of the contest proceeds exactly in the form of a "Pyramid" contest which we have established to be optimal. The series of the shows then last for eleven weeks. In each week every remaining contestant makes his/her performance. After each show, one of the remaining contestants is voted off by viewers, while the others proceed to the next stage. The procedure repeats until the finale, in which two survivors compete face to face, and one of them becomes the new "American Idol". We see that the organization structure of "American Idol" turns out to coincide with the effort-maximizing contest we have established.
Our results provide insights to contests design even when the organizer is faced with constraints on contest structure. For instance, a contest may have to be conducted with a fixed number of stages, while the contest organizer has only the flexibility to choose the number of contestants who survive each stage. Proposition 2 has fully characterized the maximal total efforts that result from any given contest sequence structure. The restricted optimal contest sequence can thus be identified through direct comparison across finite possibilities.
Rosen (1986) and Gradstein and Konrad (1999) winner-take-all principle may not be feasible. Yet our results do not lose its appeal in this aspect. Recall Lemma 3, which gives a representative contestant's expected payoffs in terms of the prize structure. We see that V 1 is in fact a weighted sum over the prizes, and the weights associated with the prizes diminish as the level of the prizes ascends. It implies that more generous purses for top-ranking prizes (wage, or other benefits) "maintain the incentive in career" (Rosen (1986) ) and increase the overall efforts. Our results confirm the insights suggested by Rosen (1986) : "contestants who succeed in attaining high ranks in elimination career ladders rest on their laurels in attempting to climb higher, unless top-ranking prizes are given a disproportionate weight in the purse".
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the optimal contest structure in a multi-phase sequential competition setting. We allow the contest organizer to design the optimal contest in two arms: the contest sequence and the allocation of a fixed total of prize purses. We show that the contest organizer must allocate the entire prize mass to a single final prize, regardless of the contest sequence. We further show that additional stages always increase the total efforts. This result provides important insights for the design of multi-stage contests. Therefore we conclude that the optimal contest must be a "winner-take-all" complete-sequence "Pyramid" contest that eliminates one contestant in each stage until the finale.
This paper concerns itself with one aspect of contests design: the maximization of total efforts, and leaves tremendous room for future extensions. First of all, we have not considered the cost of organizing the contest. The contest organizer may be concerned about the additional costs that could arise from additional stages, which should be taken into account in future research on the optimal design of multi-stage contests. Secondly, we do not consider the heterogeneity in abilities or preferences among contestants. One interesting extension is to allow for contestants with differing types. We believe that extensions in this direction will not vary the main themes of our results. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to investigate whether a stronger contestant is more likely to win the final prize in a multi-stage contest than he/she does in a single-stage one. In that sense, a model with asymmetric players may shed light on the screening effect of the multi-stage contest. In addition, our study considers a contest success function with linear impact of effort. Perhaps, another challenging extension would be to allow for other forms of contest technologies. Finally, our model assumes that contestants' efforts affect only the outcome of the sub-contest in the current stage. One may extend this model by allowing for "accumulatable" efforts, in which case efforts made in the current stage can be carried over into future stages and continue to influence contestants' likelihoods of winning.
